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REPLY ESSAYS
CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND
EMPIRICAL DATA: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR HEISE
Carl Tobias'
One decade ago, Congress undertook an ambitious, controversial
effort to reduce expense and delay in the federal civil justice system.
The Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") of 1990 instituted unprecedented nationwide experimentation by requiring that all ninety-four
federal district courts scrutinize their civil and criminal dockets and
then promulgate and apply numerous procedures which district judges
believed would save cost and time in civil litigation.1 Congress also
prescribed rigorous assessment of the six principles, guidelines, and
techniques of litigation management and expense and delay reduction
that federal districts in fact adopted and enforced. Lawmakers provided for an expert, independent evaluator that was to collect, analyze, and synthesize systematically relevant empirical data on certain
aspects of the testing. Moreover, legislators requested that the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking arm for the
federal courts, study additional features of experimentation, which
principally implicated differentiated case management ("DCM") and

various forms of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). Congress
asked that the Judicial Conference submit a report and recommendat Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
wish to thank Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Angeline Garbett for
processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the
Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana; however, the views expressed here and errors that remain are mine.
' See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994). See generally Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994) (analyzing the CJRA and
arguing that it neither compels nor authorizes district courts to adopt procedural rules inconsistent with existing law); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts,
46 STAN. L REV. 1589 (1994) (analyzing the conflicting objectives of CJRA and its predecessor, the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988).
2 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5089,
5097-98 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)) (requiring submission of a
report to Congress assessing the extent to which costs and delays were reduced as a result of a
pilot program). The RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice assessed the measures that
ten pilot districts applied. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (defining the six principles, guidelines, and
techniques of litigation management and cost and delay reduction).
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tions to lawmakers and the president on both dimensions of the testing which the federal districts had conducted.3
Congress mandated implementation of this national experiment,
which it intended to conserve fiscal and temporal resources, even
though minimal empirical data demonstrated that the federal district
courts actually experienced serious delay when resolving civil disputes. A thorough study released during 1990, for example, found
considerably less delay in terms of time to disposition than many federal courts observers had contended, thereby seeming to confirm the
proposition that resolution times in the federal districts had remained
comparatively constant over the preceding twenty years.4 Insofar as
delay did exist, the periods needed for concluding civil lawsuits appeared to vary significantly across the districts. Delay is a relative
concept.6 For instance, it seems inappropriate to characterize as delay
the time that resource-poor litigants consume in developing the factual information those parties need to prove their cases. 7 Precisely
how slow is too slow remains unclear. Furthermore, Congress prescribed effectuation of this expansive, costly experiment with measures for decreasing expense and delay in civil litigation, even though
similar efforts in numerous states and in a significant number of federal districts suggested that the courts had exhausted practically all of
the advantages that they could derive from procedural reforms.

3 See Civil Justice Reform Act § 104 (calling for a report on the results of the demonstration program that experiments with DCM and ADR systems). The Judicial Conference assessed
the measures that five demonstration districts applied. See id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)
(authorizing the Judicial Conference as the policymaking arm for the federal courts).
4 See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990). See also TERENCE DUNGWORTH &
NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 25 (1990) (contending that no evidence substantiated the assertion that
time to disposition had increased).
5 See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of CongressionalAction Affecting the Courts,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 99, 101 (observing that, while variations exist
among the districts, no study has described why some do well in moving cases and others do
poorly). See also Lauren Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the FederalCourts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 115, 122 (1991) (same).
6 See, e.g., Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics
and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 849-51 (1994) (discussing problems created by a lack of
common understanding of delay); Robel, supra note 5, at 117-23 (observing the need to rethink
the definition of the delay problem).
7 See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1423 (1992) (arguing that "individuals who lack resources and
information need greater, rather than less, discovery"). See also Robel, supra note 5, at 121
n.37 (noting that public interest litigants cited delay most frequently when asked their greatest
criticism of the litigation process).
8 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT OF 1990
FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY ASSESSMENT

OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES (1997), reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT]. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 599.
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It should not have been surprising, therefore, that the comprehensive evaluation, which the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND
Corporation performed at the instruction of Congress, ascertained that
the judicial case management mechanisms prescribed and implemented by districts pursuant to CRA may have saved some time but
only minimally reduced cost in civil cases. 9 Moreover, the Judicial
Conference rejected extension of the six statutorily-enumerated principles, guidelines, and techniques of litigation management and expense and delay reduction beyond the ten pilot federal district courts
that experimented with these approaches. The Judicial Conference
correspondingly suggested an alternative program to conserve economic and temporal resources. 10
During 1996, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
the Civil Rules appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to explore
whether those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
The Discovery Subcomgovern discovery required amendment.'
RAND Corporation Inby
the
mittee astutely commissioned studies
a thoroughgoconcluded
stitute for Civil Justice, which had recently
for detechniques
and
guidelines,
principles,
ing assessment of the
and by
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under
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by
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creasing cost and delay applied
federal
of
the
arm
research
principal
the
the Federal Judicial Center,
of
the
analyses
preparing
for
responsibility
primary
courts, which had
2
The
districts.'
the measures enforced by the CJRA demonstration
new evaluations, which expanded on the empirical data that RAND
and the Federal Judicial Center had assembled, assessed and synthesized in the CJRA effort, found that discovery functioned comparatively well as a general matter and created the greatest difficulty in a
9 See James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial
Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L REV. 17, 18, 41 (1997)
(finding that the pilot program had little impact on litigation cost savings and time to disposition). See also infra note 24 and accompanying text.
10 See JUDtCtAL CONFERENcEREPORT, supra note 8, at 89-90 ("Because this pilot project,
as a package, did not have a great impact on reducing cost and delay, the Judicial Conference
does not recommend that it be applied nationally."). See generally Carl Tobias, The Judicial
Conference Report and the Conclusion of FederalCivil Justice Reform, 175 F.R.D. 351 (1998)
(assessing the Judicial Conference Report and suggesting prompt resolution, preferably by
Congress, of the question of whether CJRA has expired).
1 See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 181 F.R.D. 24, 25
(1998). See also Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the FederalDiscovery Rules
Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L REV. 517, 521 (1998) (describing appointment and
activities of subcommittee).
12 See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: FurtherAnalysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data,39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998) (reporting the results of the follow-up RAND study); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure PracticeUnder the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525 (1998) (reporting
results of the FJC study). See also Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory
Comm. on Civil Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (2000) (discussing the subcommittee's response to the results of
the studies); supranotes 2-3, 9-10 and accompanying text.
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rather small percentage of relatively complex cases. 13 Notwithstanding these instructive findings, the Judicial Conference substantially
modified several significant features of pretrial discovery, a process
which is essential to modem civil litigation. The Conference instituted important changes for all civil lawsuits in the scope of discovery
14
and in the strictures that cover mandatory prediscovery disclosure.
These two vignettes of contemporary public policymaking in the
areas of federal civil justice reform and federal civil procedure resist
easy understanding and might even appear to be somewhat counterintuitive. Nevertheless, a recent law review article, 5 authored by
Professor Michael Heise, illuminates those stories and informs our
understanding of the federal and state civil justice systems more
broadly.
All of the propositions above mean that Professor Heise's valuable contribution deserves a response. This essay undertakes that effort. The initial section of the paper provides a comparatively brief
descriptive assessment of Justice Delayed?. The second part of this
Response considers how Professor Heise enhances our appreciation
of the two initiatives examined above and of civil justice reform generally. The third part offers a number of recommendations for future
treatment of the federal and state civil justice processes.

I. DEscRmTwE ANALYSIS
Justice Delayed? significantly advances understanding of the
federal and state civil justice systems. Professor Heise first places the
issue of civil justice delay in its broader historical context and examines earlier attempts to collect empirical data on the question. The
author finds that undue delay has persisted as a complication that
frustrates the administration of civil justice, "despite well-intentioned
reform efforts to reduce" case disposition time.' The difficulty has
received minimal assessment, primarily because informative data are
13 See Kakalik et al., supra note 12, at 682 ("The empirical data show that any problems
that may exist with discovery are concentrated in a minority of the cases, and the evidence indicates that discovery costs can be very high in some cases."); Willging et al., supra note 12, at
534-35 (same). A National Center for State Courts study of discovery in five states reached
somewhat similar conclusions, See Susan Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts
Out of Control?, STATE CT. J., Spring 1993, at 8, 14 (finding that discovery is conducted less
frequently than presumed). But see John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal
Flmvs, 84 MINN. L. REv. 505, 506-09 (2000) (demonstrating empirically that discovery disputes
occur in significantly greater numbers now than in the past).
14 See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 344-46 (U.S.
2000). See generally Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 FederalCivil Rules Amendments, 22
CARDOzo L. REv. 75, 79-84 (2000) (critically assessing the amendments and evaluating their
potential effects).
's Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 813 (2000).
16 See id. at 818. See generally supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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somewhat scarce and numerous intrinsic complexities attend the research issue.17 The problem of undue delay, or at least its perception,
has prompted serious, successive attempts to expedite case resolution
since the mid-twentieth century. 18 Nonetheless, initiatives that have
closely evaluated the impacts of the various reforms instituted on disposition time have generally detected minimal direct, systematic effect.' 9
Professor Heise determines that ambivalence characterizes the
relationship between empirical research and the attempts of public
policymakers to improve the civil justice system.20 He ascertains that
"little comprehensive data exist that inform many civil justice reform
efforts., 21 He also describes "one recent and notable exception" to
this dearth of assessments-the evaluation conducted by the RAND
Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice of the pilot program effectuated under CJRA. This analysis, according to Professor Heise, "represents the most recent
22 large-scale empirical study of this country's
civil justice system.,

7 See Heise, supranote 15, at 818 ("The problem remains understudied principally due to
the relative scarcity of helpful data as well as the research question's inherent complexities.").
See generally Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L, REV. 374, 419-21 (1982) (arguing that judicial management of civil litigation is difficult to evaluate because data collection at
the trial court level is a recent phenomenon, current empirical research techniques are inaccurate, and valid comparisons between districts are not always possible); Michael J. Saks, Do We
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort LitigationSystem-And Why Not?, 140 U.
PA. L REV. 1147, 1149 (1992) (arguing that existing empirical research is inadequate for
drawing reliable conclusions about the litigation process).
18 See Heise, supranote 15, at 818. See also HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY INTHE COURT
71-81 (1959) (discussing one method for reducing delay by shifting jury trials to shorter bench
trials). See generally George L, Priest, PrivateLitigantsand the Court Congestion Problem, 69
B.U. L REV. 527, 527 (1989) (arguing that little understanding of litigation delay exists despite
it being the focus of intense studies and reform efforts since the 1950s).
19 See Heise, supra note 15, at 818. See generally THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR. Er AL.,
PRETRIAL DELAY: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 45 (1978) ("Attempts to reduce delay
through special programs, conferencing devices, diversion and other procedural tinkering have
seldom proved themselves in practice."); BARRY MAHONEY Er AL, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL
COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCIION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 193

(1988) (finding that the use of alternative dispute resolution programs is not correlated with
faster processing of cases).
2 See Heise, supra note 15, at 818-19. See generally Bryant G. Garth, Observationson
an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV.
103, 103 (1997) (arguing that the results of empirical research regarding litigation reform are
misunderstood and suggesting use of a different type of research better suited to reform efforts).
21 Heise, supranote 15, at 819. See generallyDeborah J. Merritt & Kathryn A. Barry, Is
the Tort System in Crisis?New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 315 (1999) (offering the
first comprehensive investigation of product liability and medical malpractice verdicts-two of
the more controversial areas of recovery in the tort reform movement-that permits complex
statistical analyses of tort verdicts); supranote 17 and accompanying text.
22 Heise, supra note 15, at 819-20. See generally Kakalik et a, supra note 9 (describing
the implementation of the CJRA program and summarizing the results of the RAND study on
the effects of the CJRA's case management policies); A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case
Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
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Professor Heise observes that the RAND assessment, which
clearly concluded that the CJRA's "efficacy is mixed, at best," has
already provoked considerable lively debate in the academic literature.23 The RAND Corporation researchers determined that, on the
whole, the "pilot program, as the package was implemented, had little
effect on time to disposition," although the investigators associated
particular case management practices with "significantly reduced time
to disposition."2 4 He ascertains that the RAND results are limited bA
specific considerations that implicate the research design employed
and by a number of problems that accompany any effort when evaluators have not yet established common metrics. 26 Despite any technical questions that might restrict the validity of the RAND conclusions, Professor Heise remarks that this entity's overall finding that
the "CJRA program did not systematically reduce case disposition
time comports with the weight of prior research."2 7
After setting the issue of civil justice delay in context, the writer
explores the need for better comprehension of the civil justice system
by analyzing potential determinants of time to disposition for civil
disputes that culminate in a jury trial. Professor Heise invokes empirical data that the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") and
the United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics
("BJS") recently collected, evaluated, and synthesized during a study
which explored one year of outcomes in civil lawsuits that reached
jury trials in forty-five of the seventy-five heaviest-populated counties
in the United States.28 He considers geographic locale, party compo877, 900-05 (1993) (arguing that the research provided for by CJRA will not yield adequate
information for developing new policy).
23 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. See generally John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch
Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 551
(1999) (critically evaluating the CRA as a failure in most respects); Symposium, Evaluation of
the Civil JusticeReform Act, 49 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1997).
24 Kakalik et al., supra note 9, at 18, 41. See also Heise, supra note 15, at 820; Tobias,
supra note 8, at 593 (describing some of the case management practices adopted by specific
districts).
2 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. See generally McArthur, supra note 23, at 633-34
(arguing for a more carefully constructed experimental design than that used by CJRA).
2 See Heise, supra note 15, at 820. Professor Heise identifies four specific problems: (1)
the pilot program's small sample size, (2) potential selection bias involving the pilot and control
courts, (3) treatment effect issues, and (4) the limited aspect of the Civil Justice Reform Act
program assessed. See id. at 821-22. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221,239-40 (1997) (arguing that
a systematic body of knowledge in this area is needed because, in the past, assertions regarding
civil procedure reform have been based upon hunches or theories); Jeffrey J. Connaughton,
Judicial Accountability and the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997) (arguing that judiciai
resistance to change was a primary reason why CJRA resulted in no measurable effect on litigation delay).
27 Heise, supra note 15, at 822. See generally Priest, supra note 18, at 537 (describing
how the interaction between court congestion and volume of litigation explains why litigation
delay studies fail to demonstrate a systematic effect of reduced delay).
2 See Heise, supra note 15, at 822.
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sition, and party type, as well as certain case types, results, and character to be important variables.2 9 Professor Heise believes that an
empirically grounded understanding of the attributes of case resolution time will help facilitate public policymaking and reforms that
attempt to secure more expeditious, economical, and equitable civil
justice.30 Professor Heise ascertains that the evaluation performed on
the country's largest counties seriously challenges the effectiveness of
recent civil justice reform endeavors, which emphasizes factors that

do not affect case disposition time and which neglect additional factors that do significantly influence the civil justice system.31 For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act prescribed, almost exclusively,
process-oriented principles, guidelines, and techniques, as well as a
number of related mechanisms, principally involving DCM and ADR,
even though many state trial courts and numerous federal district
courts had previously realized virtually all of the benefits to be extracted from these measures. 32 Moreover, Congress apparently ignored additional considerations, such as substantial criminal dockets
and the prolonged periods required to fill judicial vacancies, which

can slow civil case resolution.3
Professor Heise concludes by summarizing and elaborating upon
a number of the concepts examined above. He emphasizes that alternative approaches may warrant exploration when empirical data, as
well as practical experience, demonstrate a particular course of action's inefficacy. He carefully admonishes that assessors must undertake greater empirical research before it will be possible to posit
definitive determinations, especially if empirical "data rather than
impressions or anecdotes are to inform public policy and reform ef-

29See id. at 824-27.

See generally infra note 65 and accompanying text.
30 See Heise, supra note 15, at 817. See generally FED. R. Ctv. P. 1 (requiring that the
rules "be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action"); Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of FederalRule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L REv. 1325 (1995) (examining the problem presented by a rule, such as Rule 1,that attempts to provide direction on the basis of overarching values); Carl Tobias, The New Certiorariand a NationalStudy of the Appeals Courts,
81 CORNELL REV. 1264, 1286 n.90 (1996) (assessing the ideals of Rule 1 and suggesting that
they should apply equally to appellate courts).
31 See Heise, supra note 15, at 817-18, 848. See generally McArthur, supra note 23, at
633-38 (suggesting randomly assigned pilots to control for selection bias in the CJRA project).
32 See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., U.S. DISTRIC" COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ADVISORY
GROUP REPORT pt. II (1991) (discussing the impact of the criminal docket on trial delay); U.S.
DIsRIcr COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, ADVISORY GROUP REPORT
AND RECOMMENDED PLAN 57-58 (1992) (assessing impact of criminal docket, new legislation,
and executive action on litigation delay); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CitV. JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTs 21-22 (1996). But cf.28
U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (1994) (requiring districts to analyze criminal dockets as a part of civil justice reform).
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forts in the future." 34 Professor Heise specifically calls for the systematic collection, examination, and synthesis of cross-sectional data,
of increased data from additional federal and state jurisdictions over
larger time periods, and of data on parties' settlement activity.3 He
asserts that information such as this will appreciably enhance comprehension of the civil justice system and help reformers who attempt
to improve the process by decreasing resolution time for civil cases.
II. How JUSTICEDELAYED? INCREASES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF
RECENT REFORMS

Professor Heise's recent article contributes substantially to appreciation of the contemporary federal and state civil justice systems
in the United States. Justice Delayed? correspondingly increases our
understanding of modem civil justice reform efforts, and in particular
of the two procedural public policy initiatives instituted by Congress
and the federal rule revision entities during the 1990s.
A. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
Justice Delayed? demonstrates that the explicit congressional
purpose in passing the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 was to restrict expense and delay in civil lawsuits through the application of
numerous procedural measures. The legislation was passed, even
though it was unclear that cost or delay was sufficiently problematic
to deserve remediation or that process-oriented change was the best
solution. A substantial number of the six principles, guidelines, and
techniques as well as additional measures that Congress prescribed
(particularly DCM and ADR) had already received application in
many states and quite a few districts, and much of this experimentation demonstrated the limitations inherent in those procedures' application. The previous testing in the state and federal courts indicated
34 Heise, supra note 15, at 848. Accord Herbert Kritzer et al., Rule 11: Moving Beyond
the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269 (1992) (finding that assertions regarding the effects

of amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been biased by anecdotes of
large, unrepresentative federal cases); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some CautionaryObservations,53 U. CHI. L REV.

366, 367 (1986) (arguing that the impact of any method of judicial resolution be verifiable by
accepted empirical research techniques).
3
See Heise, supra note 15, at 848-49. See generally CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA
F. X. LrrRAS, BUREAU JUST. STAT., CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1996: CPiL

TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS INLARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (1999) (providing preliminary findings

from a study expanding the 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State Courts); Burbank, supra note 26,
at 240 (calling for research into the rate and timing of settlement).

36 See Heise, supra note 15, at 849. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L REV. 1567, 1584 (1991) (arguing that

local rule promulgation with collection of empirical data in specific districts is the most costeffective method of experimentation); Laurens Walker, Perfecting FederalCivil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted FieldExperiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (same).
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and the CJRA undertaking apparently reaffirms that the state and federal judiciaries have achieved practically all of the expense and delay
reduction that can be achieved with process-based reforms. Indeed,
non-procedural approaches-including augmentation of the federal
judiciary's resources, alteration of court structure or court administration, such as the individual calendaring system, or change in the present American adversarial system-would more efficaciously secure
additional, meaningful fiscal and temporal economies.37
Professor Heise confirms the suggestions of other federal court
observers that Congress neglected or underestimated several important factors that are responsible for, or could decrease, cost and delay
in civil disputes. For instance, some individuals, namely federal district judges and certain entities participating in the CJRA endeavor,
remarked that criminal prosecutions are a substantial source of expense and delay, a factor that Congress effectively ignored, 8 while
other people and institutions indicated that more expeditious confirmation of nominees for judicial vacancies on the district courts would
save significant financial and temporal resources.39
The ideas in the two paragraphs above illustrate that there may
be insufficient communications, both among individuals and entities
responsible for civil justice reform in the branches of the federal government and between those people and institutions and their counterparts in state governments. If Congress, for example, had been more
attentive to the perspectives of numerous federal judges or had considered more fully procedural experimentation that many states and a
number of federal districts had conducted, lawmakers might have relied less substantially on process-oriented reforms, which proved
rather ineffective, and perhaps prescribed other, comparatively effective measures.
Justice Delayed? also demonstrates that after public policymakers commission empirical data, they must carefully consult and thoroughly employ this information when implementing decisions about
37 See Tobias, supra note 8, at 599. See generally JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 67 (finding that "the cost of litigation [i]s
driven by factors other than judicial case
management procedures"); McArthur, supra note23, at 633-40 (arguing for the introduction of
a more structured program).
38 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39

See, e.g., U.S. DISTRIC" COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICr OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT

OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP pt. 1TI(C)(2)(a) (1991) ("These problems
will recur, however, if future judicial vacancies are not promptly filled ....
");U.S. DiSTRICr
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE

REFORM ADVISORY GROUP pt. ll(B)(1-2) (1991) (noting that expense and delay has been caused
by failure to fill promptly judicial vacancies as they arise). See generally Kim Dayton, Judicial
Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
757 (1993); Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47
EMORY LJ.527 (1998) (offering suggestions for implementation of alternatives to alleviate the
problem).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:235

procedural change. For instance, Congress authorized several comprehensive assessments of the CJRA experimentation, but seemingly
failed to consider and capitalize on the results derived from the analyses undertaken. Even Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), the enactment's foremost proponent and the member of Congress for whom
the legislation was named, 40 apparently could muster so little interest
in the statute by the conclusion of its application that he sponsored a
provision which continued only CJRA's case reporting requirements.41 It even remains unclear whether the legislation that lawmakers ostensibly scheduled to expire seven years after its 1990 passage
has actually reached "sunset. A 2 Indeed, during 1995, Republican
House members introduced a number of proposals as part of the Contract With America before the legislative branch had received an
evaluations of the 1990 enactment that Congress had commissioned.
Several provisions of the legal reforms included in the Contract
would have imposed substantive and procedural changes that eclipsed
certain features of CJRA.
B. The 2000 FederalRule Revisions
Justice Delayed? similarly increases comprehension of the recent rule revision proceeding culminating in the Supreme Court's
promulgation of the 2000 amendments related to civil discovery. Professor Heise illustrates the compelling need for public policymakers
to commission expert, independent evaluations that systematically
gather, analyze, and synthesize dependable empirical data, as well as
the need to examine closely and deploy carefully the material collected as a predicate for procedural decision-making. For example,
when the empirical data requested by the Discovery Subcommittee of
the Advisory Committee suggested that discovery was generally
working well and presenting substantial difficulties in rather few

40 See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1599-1602. See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress
and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1285 (1994).
41 See Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub L. No. 105-53, § 2,111 Stat. 1173 (1997). See generally
Edward Cavanagh, Congress'sFailedAttempt to Spur Efficiency: The Legacy of the Civil Justice Reform Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28. In fairness, Congress did pass the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, which lawmakers apparently intended to institutionalize
certain facets of CJRA experimentation. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (Supp. 1998).
42 See Carl Tobias, Did the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Actually Expire?, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 887 (1998) (arguing that Congress should proclaim that the act has expired,
ending the uncertainty). See also Patrick Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range
Plan, 46 AM. U. L. Rv. 625, 655-56 (1997) (stating that once the national implications are
clear, Congress should require districts to stop using individualized plans).
43 See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995) (introducing a bill to reform the federal civil justice
system). See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995); Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV.
699, 721-34 (1995) (setting forth an analysis of the proposals contained in the Common Sense
Legal Reforms Act).
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comparatively complicated cases,44 the rule revision entities should
have consulted several alternative means of proceeding. The revisors
might have considered more seriously the prospects of postponing
amendment or rejecting change altogether. At the least, the revisors
should have entertained the possibility of tailoring procedural modification to the problems created by the relatively limited number of
complex lawsuits, rather than adopting alterations that applied to
every case.45 It is also important to realize that even the assessments
that evaluators performed examined the operation of the existing discovery requirements, such as the 1993 provision that imposed mandatory prediscovery disclosure, instead of experimenting with the
measures that the Supreme Court eventually prescribed
during 2000,
46
to understand how they would function in practice.
C. GeneralIdeas
Both the experiences of Congress in passing CJRA and of the
federal rule revisors when promulgating the 2000 civil procedure
amendments demonstrate that relevant public policymakers appropriately commissioned empirical assessments, albeit at different time
periods. In fairness, Congress had the benefit of an evaluation undertaken by the Foundation For Change and of additional analyses,
but it is unclear how systematically those conducting the assessments
collected, evaluated, and synthesized applicable empirical data, and
how substantially Congress relied on the analyses in drafting CJRA.47

Moreover, Congress properly commissioned empirical assessments of
the experimentation that districts implemented pursuant to CJRA.

44 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
45 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.4 (3d. ed. 1995) (tailoring procedures by

case types). See generally Levin, supra note 22, at 898-99 (recognizing that some types of cases
need "specialized treatment"); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery
Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REv. 27 (1994)
(arguing that discovery rules should be drafted to meet the unique needs of different types of
cases).
4 For suggestions on how the federal rule revisors might conduct such experimentation,
see Levin, supra note 36. See also Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for Federal Procedural
Rulemaking, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 2 (forthcoming Spring 2001); Walker, supra
note 36 (arguing that the processes guiding development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the past are no longer appropriate). See generally Tobias, supra note 14, at 85-90 (offering
specific suggestions for future remedies through legislation).
47 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN L. REv. 1393,
1410-21 (1994) (asserting that such studies were based on "soft social science methodologies,"
and thus inadequate); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1601-02 (stating that many judges were concemed that there had been insufficient consultation with the judiciary in preparing the reports
and assessing the efforts of the Foundation For Change). See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 416, 101st Cong. 13-14 (1990) (praising the reports, stating that "[t]he
committee is indebted to the members of the task force for the comprehensive nature of their
recommendations").
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However, Congress essentially ignored the results of the evaluations
that the RAND Corporation and the Judicial Conference completed. 48
The federal rule revision entities also aptly undertook assessments of the procedural provisions that they contemplated altering
before proposing modification. 49 Perhaps those responsible for
studying the rules and formulating recommendations for improvement
recognized that the 1983 amendment in Rule 11 became the most
controversial change over the six-decade history of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure partly because the revision entities had gathered no
empirical data on the provision's operation prior to altering the 1938
version. 50 The rule revisors may have similarly appreciated that the
substantial controversy surrounding the 1993 amendment of Rule 26
requiring mandatory prediscovery disclosure was attributable to limited understanding about how that procedure would actually work.
Thus, although decision-makers in Congress and in the Judicial Conference rule revision committees correctly called for studies, they
should then have seriously considered and used the findings of the
evaluations when developing public policy in the procedure field.52
1H. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The analysis above shows the important need for additional
studies of the type that Professor Heise has conducted, as well as for
assessments like those commissioned by Congress under CJRA and
48 See supranotes 33, 38 and accompanying text.
49 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. Even those studies analyzed how the

existing federal civil rules operated, not how the revisions the Court eventually prescribed
would work in practice by experimenting with the proposed amendments first. See supra note
46 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (finding that Rule 11 was controversial partly because "there is a conflict between or among circuits on practically every important
question of interpretation and policy under the Rule"); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reformfor FederalCivil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455, 455-59 (1993) (stating that the
Advisory Committee's note explaining the change does not make any reference to empirical
research). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 1606-17 (noting that the 1983 revision to Rule
11 was sharply criticized, despite a comprehensive analysis by the Advisory Committee).
51 See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (1992) (asserting that many lawyers felt the amendment would
actually increase costs and delay); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: MandatoryInformal Discovery and the Politicsof Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 820-21 (1991) (finding that
many research issues regarding the revision are unresolved). See generally Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L REV. 1433, 1434 (1999) (arguing that the revision was
problematic because the revisors had minimal empirical data and little experience with the practical application of the procedure).
52 Developments implicating time to disposition and potential reform, which resemble
those involving the federal district courts, have occurred in federal appeals courts. Professor
Heise, however, minimally mentions appellate court resolution times or possible reform, and
those phenomena are beyond the scope of this response, even though Justice Delayed? does
enhance appreciation of the developments. For exposition of some relevant ideas related to the
appellate courts, see infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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the Advisory Committee pursuant to its rule revision authority. Those
with responsibility for reform of procedure must commission expert,
independent evaluators that systematically assemble, analyze, and
synthesize empirical data relevant to procedural decision-making,
while policymakers should consult and apply these studies and base
reforms on the assessments' results. The CJRA experimentation and
the rule amendment proceeding that underlay the 2000 federal rule
revisions, as well as state civil justice reform efforts and endeavors
similar to the NCSC-BJS study on which Professor Heise relied, have
generated a substantial quantity of informative empirical data. Decision-makers must capitalize on this material in formulating procedures for civil litigation in the twenty-first century.5 3
It bears reiteration that even the finest empirical data alone will
not foster improvement, unless procedural policymakers consider and
employ the information that evaluators have collected. Illustrative are
developments in the 1990s involving CJRA, the 2000 federal rules
amendments discussed above,54 and experiences implicating the federal appellate courts. With regard to the appeals courts, numerous
observers holding quite diverse perspectives have found, and considerable empirical data have shown, that the tribunals have lacked resources to treat caseload increases. 55 Notwithstanding information
indicating that the courts have delivered less appellate justice, Congress has evinced reluctance to reduce appeals by limiting jurisdiction.5 6 Congress has also been reluctant to address docket growth by
expanding relevant resources, such as the authorization of additional
judgeships or court administrative staff.57 Lawmakers should reex53

They must also capitalize on a recent study that collected much valuable empirical data

on the appellate system. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
54

See supranotes 1-14, 37-46 and accompanying text.

55 See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE

U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994); CHRISTOPHER BANKS, JUDICIAL POLiTICS IN THE D.C.
CIRCUIT COURT 126-29 (1999) (stating that strategies employed by the appellate courts have
been insufficient to treat the caseload crisis); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (finding that inevitable changes must be made in the appellate courts to
deal with the increasing volume of cases). But see CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S
REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF

APPEALS (1999) (asserting that the appellate courts do not need additional judges to handle
appeals).
5 See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justicein the FirstCircuit,24 SUFFOLK U.
L REV. 29, 34-37 (1990) (stating that such proposals are controversial and unlikely); Boyce F.
Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHtIO ST. L J. 177, 181 (1999) (arguing
that changes must be made in the opinion output of courts because Congress will not limit jurisdiction). See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 77-84 (addressing the appropriate jurisdiction of the federal courts).
57 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 55, at 1-30 (evaluating the history of the courts of appeals
and their state today); BANKS, supra note 55, at 126-29 (arguing that the better solution is to
increase the capacity of the appellate courts). These and other federal courts observers attribute
legislative reluctance partly to political considerations.
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amine this important situation and prescribe measures to rectify or
ameliorate the circumstances.
Several ideas already enumerated suggest the need for greater
and better communications among officials with responsibility for
decision-making about procedure in various entities of the state and
federal governments. For instance, Congress should have more
closely consulted the procedural experimentation in numerous states
and federal districts before prescribing certain civil justice reform
measures during 1990.58 The federal rule revisors in proposing, and
the Supreme Court in promulgating, the 1983, 1993, and 2000
amendments should similarly have commissioned and considered additional relevant data, particularly on the operations of the procedures
that the Court ultimately adopted, before effectuating change.59
These actions could have led to the implementation of new provisions
that were more efficacious and less controversial. State officials and
institutions should correspondingly examine experimentation that the
federal courts and other states conduct. For example, states in the
South and West, which have encountered rapid population growth
and escalating caseloads, might review the efforts to treat mounting
dockets with few resources instituted by the larger federal
60 appeal
courts and the large counties scrutinized in Justice Delayed?
Public policymakers at the federal and state levels as well as
evaluators and scholars may also want to elaborate upon the findings,
assertions and raw data which Professor Heise has offered. For instance, comparing the large counties in the state systems with federal
districts in the same locale could prove productive. More specifically, Professor Heise's determination that Fairfax County, Virginia
compiled the fastest civil case disposition time of the seventy-five
counties at the state level 6' correlates with Fairfax's location in one of
the most expeditious federal districts, the Eastern District of Vir-

58

See supra notes 8, 32-33, 38-39 and accompanying text. Indeed, one reason for the

CJRA's passage may have been insufficient communication between lawmakers and federal
judges who comprise a majority on most Judicial Conference rule revision committees. See,
e.g., Linda S. Mullinex, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375,
386, 407-09 (1992); Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United ": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 114-16. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: CourtRulemaking, DemocraticLegitimacy,and ProceduralEfficacy, 87
GEO. IU. 887, 902-07 (1999) (criticizing the current rulemaking process); Tobias, supra note 8,
at 622-25 (explaining tensions that arise during rule revision).
59 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 30-32 (describing caseload problems in the
Ninth Circuit); Heise, supranote 15, at 836-38 (evaluating data for case disposition time based
on locale). See generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A PreferableApproachfor the Ninth
Circuit, 88 CALL. REV. 1657 (2000) (proposing a less disruptive approach than circuit-splitting
for treating docket growth with few resources).
61 See Heise, supra note 15, at 836-38.
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ginia.62 Not surprisingly, Fairfield County, Connecticut, the county
that recorded the second slowest resolution time,63 is situated in the
District of Connecticut, one of the federal trial courts that requires the
greatest period to conclude civil lawsuits. 64 These findings seem to
reinforce the local legal culture hypothesis that phenomena, such as
judicial practices, lawyers' ethics, and litigant strategic behavior in a
specific
geographic area, can usefully explain the pace of civil
65
cases.

CONCLUSION

Justice Delayed? contributes substantially to our understanding
of the contemporary federal and state civil justice systems. Professor
Heise affords instructive insights on the importance of having procedural policymakers commission expert, independent evaluators to
collect, analyze, and synthesize empirical data. He further denotes
the importance of insuring that decisionmakers closely consult and
carefully apply the material assembled when reforming civil justice.
The author also aptly contends that there must be considerable, additional rigorous assessment of the civil justice systems before it will be

possible to reach definitive conclusions about precisely how they operate and might be improved.

62

See

ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS 1999, at 166 tbl. C-5 (1999). See generally Kim Dayton, Case Managementin
the Eastern Districtof Virginia, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 445 (1992); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery
Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposalsto Amend the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,26
U.S.F. L REV. 189, 205-07 (1992) (presenting the Eastern District of Virginia as a model of
success for expediting resolution).
63 See Heise, supra note 15, at 837 tbl.5.
64 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 62, at 166 tbl. C-5 (1999).
See generally U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTICr OF CONNECTICUT, REPORT OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP (1993).
65 See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION
IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 54 (1978) (suggesting that speed and backlog may be a result of expectations, practices, and informal rules of behavior of both judges and lawyers within the local
culture); MAHONEY E AL., supra note 19, at 87-89 (examining the affects of practitioner attitudes and expectations on court delay); Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy Disunionism in
the FederalCourts, 45 DUKE 1-J. 929, 944-47 (1996) (describing differences caused by "procedural localism"); Robel, supranote 1, at 1483-85 (arguing for a more cautious approach to local
decision making). See also Heise, supra note 15, at 826-27, 836-37 (describing the effects of
locale on variations in case disposition time). But see Herbert Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans,
Local Legal Culture and the Controlof Litigation, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 535 (1993) (arguing
that variation among districts is a result of structural and situational differences rather than local
I
legal culture).

